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∗

This Article looks at a historical problem—the first use of case law by English
royal justices in the thirteenth century—and makes it a starting point for thinking about
the ways legal reasoning works in the modern common law. In the first Part of the
Article, I show that, at its origin, the English justices’ use of decided cases as a source
of law was inspired by the work civil and canon law scholars were doing with written
authorities in the medieval universities. In an attempt to make the case that English law
was on par with civil law and canon law, the justices and clerks of the royal courts
began to treat cases as if they were the opinions of great jurists, to apply the same
types of dialectical reasoning that were used in civil law discourse to those cases, and
to work them into systems of authority. They used cases, as the modern common law
does; but they used cases to create systems of the kind we usually associate with civil
law. In the second Part of the Article, I turn to the modern common law and, using the
methods of medieval case law as a mirror, show that the differences between civil law
and common law reasoning are more perceived than real. American lawyers tend to
view common law as flexible and creative, whereas they view civil law as ossified and
hierarchical. This largely stems from the fact that common lawyers focus on the

Visiting Assistant Professor, Cornell Law School; Ph.D., History, Cornell University, 2011; M.A., History,
Cornell University, 2009; J.D., LL.M., Cornell Law School, 2005; B.A., College of William and Mary, 2002. I
would like to thank Paul Hyams, Paul Brand, Duane Corpis, Bernadette Meyler, David Powers, Ken
Pennington, Eliza Buhrer, Melissa Winders, Sarah Harlan-Haughey, Ada-Maria Kuskowski, Guillaume Ratel,
Abigail Fisher, and the participants in the 2010 American Society for Legal History Conference for their
comments on earlier versions of this Article. Translations, apart from translations from the Bracton treatise,
are mine. For quotations to Bracton, I generally follow Samuel Thorne’s translation, with occasional
modifications. All errors are my own.
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judicial opinion as the place where legal reasoning takes place. By integrating other
texts, like the student outline and the restatement—which seek to create a harmonious
system out of judicial opinions—into the picture of common law reasoning, I show that
common law reasoning shares quite a bit in common with civil law reasoning.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Common law and civil law are the two major competing families of law in the
world today. It is misleading to talk about them as two unities, since each has many
individual instantiations in various countries; but lawyers within each family share
some basic cultural assumptions. Common law sees itself as an autochthonous
development of an individualistic and insular English culture. Civil law sees itself as
the direct heir to Roman law. The modern civil law’s quintessential texts are codes,
which express the will of the people through the legislature and present the law as a
coherent system.1 The common law’s are cases, and common lawyers are educated to
view case law as a flexible mode of legal development that brings the weight of
practical judicial experience to the process of legal change, in contradistinction to the
rigidity and deductive nature of the code.2
In this Article, I look at a historical case that collapses the cultural differences
between common law and civil law. I show that England’s first flirtation with case law
in the thirteenth century was not a purely insular, English development, but was
actually inspired by medieval civil law. Cases were introduced into the education of
clerks in the royal courts—there was no profession of lawyers yet in England—
because, to the justices and clerks of the royal courts, they looked similar to the types
of authorities one would find in civil law texts. These justices argued from individual
cases, as we do in modern common law discourse; but they focused on how they could
work the individual cases into a harmonious system, a preoccupation usually associated
with the civil law today.
In Parts II and III, I look at the genres of judicial writing in thirteenth-century
England. Part II focuses on the plea rolls, the administrative records of the king’s
courts, and collections of plea roll entries that were made by justices and clerks in the
middle decades of the century. In Part III, I turn to the treatise commonly called
Bracton, which works those cases into a system of law. The authors of Bracton, royal
justices themselves, thought the justices who decided the cases recorded on the plea
rolls were important as personal authorities, and, in this respect, were not so different
from modern common lawyers, who ascribe a great deal of authority to their judges.

1. See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 34–37 (2004) (discussing the French civil law system, in which
judges see themselves as mechanically applying the code rather than making law themselves through their
decisions).
2. American comparativists often view civil law as overly formalist. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE
OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIèCLE) 107 (1997) (describing the average American lawyer’s perception of the
European legal culture as formalistic); LASSER, supra note 1, at 27–28 (attributing to the traditional American
comparative tradition the belief that French civil judicial system is a “bastion of judicial formalism” where
codes are applied mechanically); cf. 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 507–09 (1959) (discussing the risks
associated with a pseudoscientific legal system).
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These authors also placed a heavy emphasis on systematization of the law, an emphasis
that they drew from their experience with medieval civil law.
In Part IV, I turn to genres of legal writing in the modern common law and show
that, although the common law’s identity comes from the judicial opinion—which
places the judge as an individual authority at the center of legal development—
American common law also produces texts that emphasize the system over the
individual. These texts—the student outline and the restatement of law—occupy a far
less central space in the imagination of the common law than the case. Where the
common law likes to think of itself as an unfolding story told by its judges, it retains,
just beneath the surface, the civilian desire for an all-encompassing code without
contradictions. Bracton, a text that keeps both desires on the surface level, helps us to
model this.
II.
A.

CASE LAW IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

Collecting Cases

By the middle of the thirteenth century, justices and clerks in the royal courts
were collecting records of cases from the plea rolls, their administrative records, and
treating them as legal literature. This culture of case collecting became possible only
after half a century of professionalization in the royal courts. The twelfth and thirteenth
centuries are usually treated as the beginning of the English common law, although the
term itself was not employed much at the time.3 In the second half of the twelfth
century, coming out of two decades of civil war, Henry II instituted several new
procedures for recovering land lost during the anarchy.4 These procedures had many of
the elements that would become hallmarks of the common law, most importantly the
writ to begin litigation and the jury to end it.5 Henry experimented with various ways
of delivering justice to the counties and established travelling groups of royal justices
called eyres—a model his grandfather, Henry I, had used before him.6 These new
courts and procedures increased access to royal justice so that, by the time of the first
court records, we see people from all social strata suing in the king’s courts.7
By the second decade of the thirteenth century, the royal courts had developed a
corps of professional justices. During the reigns of Henry’s sons Richard and John,

3. Paul Brand, Law and Custom in the English Thirteenth Century Common Law, in CUSTOM: THE
DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF A LEGAL CONCEPT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 31 (Per Andersen & Mia MünsterSwendsen eds., 2008) (noting that what came to be known as English common law had a variety of labels in
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries).
4. See JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND
FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 126–29 (1996).
5. See id. at 127–34 (discussing the introduction of new administrative procedures including the use of
royal writs and recognitions by “lawful men”).
6. Id. at 123–26; RALPH V. TURNER, THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY IN THE AGE OF GLANVILL AND BRACTON,
c. 1176–1239, at 19–21 (1985).
7. See HUDSON, supra note 4, at 205–06 (noting that access to the central court was likely expensive, but
acknowledging that the royal courts heard cases from “minor men” who owned relatively small amounts of
land).
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three types of courts had started to take shape: a court that followed the king as he
perambulated around his realm (the court coram rege), a court that sat more or less
permanently at Westminster hall (the common bench), and a series of periodic judicial
visitations of the counties (the eyres).8 Although the justices assigned to these courts
were often great magnates or royal servants in other departments of the administration
who spent a minority of their time sitting as justices in the courts, a few justices were
recruited in the 1180s and 1190s who would spend virtually their entire careers as
justices, a group whom we might call professionals.9 Each justice had at least one clerk
who kept the justice’s plea roll, a record of the cases he had heard.10 When the justice
was a magnate, he might bring his own personal clerk along with him when he sat in
the courts.11 With the advent of the professional justices, though, we start to see some
long-term clerks who specialize in working as clerks in the courts.12 Simon of
Pattishall’s clerk, Martin of Pattishall, served his master for many years.13 When Simon
retired from the bench in 1216, Martin was elevated to justice.14 This became a fairly
common pattern for promotion to the bench from Martin’s elevation until the end of the
thirteenth century.15
It is worth pausing to note that what was happening in the king’s courts was
separate from what was happening in the universities. Oxford University was brand
new at the turn of the thirteenth century, but it already had many masters of law; and
law seems to have been taught at some cathedral schools, like Ely and Exeter.16 These
law schools did not teach the law of the king’s courts. They taught civil law—the
Roman law found in Justinian’s sixth-century Institutes, Codex, and Digest, as

8. See TURNER, supra note 6, at 65–69, 126–29.
9. See id. at 39, 73–75 (discussing the multifarious activities of early justices and the rise of a
professional judiciary).
10. Id. at 215. We know much more about the clerks of the courts in the late thirteenth and early
fourteenth centuries than we do about the clerks in the period I am surveying in this Article. This is partly due
to the fact that it was not until 1305 that clerks began to sign the plea rolls they wrote. Paul Brand, Medieval
Legal Bureaucracy: The Clerks of the King’s Courts in the Reign of Edward I, in THE MAKING OF THE
COMMON LAW 169, 170 (Paul Brand ed., 1992). We do not know precisely how the clerks of the early
thirteenth century related to the justices and the courts, whether they were thought to be in royal service or in
the service of an individual justice, or how many of them there might have been.
11. See TURNER, supra note 6, at 215–16.
12. See id. (profiling several career clerks who ultimately joined the judiciary).
13. Id. at 210–11.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 215–16 (“Certainly [serving as a clerk] was not the only route to a judgeship, but it was
becoming more and more common as the century progressed.”).
16. See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: CANONISTS,
CIVILIANS, AND COURTS 111, 237 (2008) (discussing the “talented group of decretists [who] were teaching
canon law in schools at Oxford” beginning in the late twelfth century); NICHOLAS ORME, EDUCATION IN THE
WEST OF ENGLAND, 1066–1548 52 (noting that Exeter had a vibrant cathedral school, but was losing ground to
the universities in the early thirteenth century). The evidence that Thomas of Marlborough taught Roman law
at Exeter in the early thirteenth century is no longer generally accepted, however. Jane E. Sayers,
Marlborough, Thomas of (d. 1236), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY available at http://www.o
xforddnb.com/view/article/18077.
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reinterpreted by medieval jurists—and canon law, the law of the Church.17 The two
laws were closely related; to obtain a degree in one, a student was required to learn
quite a bit of the other.18 They were both taught according to the scholastic method, to
which we will return later.19
Even if the universities did not teach the laws of England, some of the people who
worked in the king’s courts had university or cathedral school training in law. The
amount of influence that Roman law and canon law exerted on the early common law
through these schools-trained justices and royal advisors has been a major point of
debate for legal historians.20 Although at times we do find evidence that the people who
worked in the royal courts thought of their work as somewhat analogous to Roman and
canon law, university training in law was not a requirement or even a usual path to a
position in the royal courts.21 In fact, there is little direct evidence, apart from a few
Roman legal terms in the Glanvill treatise of the 1180s, that the people who worked in
the king’s courts thought of what they were doing as a discrete professional discourse
called law, rather than as a type of royal administration.22
This had changed by the 1220s. In that decade, a justice or clerk in the royal
courts began a treatise called De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliæ (“On the Laws
and Customs of England”), commonly called Bracton after the royal justice Henry de
Bratton, who was once thought to have written the treatise.23 This treatise placed
English law alongside Roman law as a complex legal system. Because of its systematic
approach to English law, Bracton is often treated as one of the great, foundational texts
of the common law.24 It is the largest compendium of English law we have from the

17. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 16, at 248 (discussing the teaching of civil and canon law at Oxford and
Cambridge); PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 45–47 (1999) (discussing the influence of
Justinian’s texts on civil law).
18. BRUNDAGE, supra note 16, at 233–34, 238; see also id. at 234 n.55 (recounting a medieval proverb:
“Legista sine canonibus parum valet, canonista sine legibus nihil,” or, “A Romanist without canon law isn’t
worth much and a canonist without Roman law is worth nothing at all”).
19. Id. at 248–57. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the scholastic method.
20. For two recent surveys of the literature on the influence of Roman law on the common law, see
generally Anne J. Duggan, Roman, Canon, and Common Law in Twelfth-Century England: The Council of
Northampton (1164) Re-Examined, 83 HIST. RES. 379 (2010); and Joshua C. Tate, Ownership and Possession
in the Early Common Law, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 280 (2006).
21. TURNER, supra note 6, at 37–39, 150–52, 231–36.
22. Apart from his introduction, which draws from the introduction to Justinian’s Institutes, the Glanvill
author uses the Roman term proprietas three times, the term possessio once, and the terms crimen and
criminalis about half-a-dozen times. RANULPH DE GLANVILL, ATTR., THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 3–4, 6, 132, 171 (G.D.G. Hall ed. &
trans., 1965).
23. BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne
trans.) (William S. Hein & Co., photo. reprint 1997) (1968–1977) (Latin text Yale Univ. Press 1942) (c. 1220–
1250) (hereinafter BRACTON).
24. Pollock and Maitland, in their magisterial work on medieval English law, titled the chapter on the
thirteenth century “The Age of Bracton.” 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 174 (2d ed., 1898). The literature on Bracton is
vast. Although most of it pre-dates Samuel Thorne’s re-dating of the treatise, there is much in the literature
that has not been superseded. For instance, CARL GÜTERBOCK, BRACTON AND HIS RELATION TO THE ROMAN
LAW: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE ROMAN LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES (Brinton Coxe trans., Fred
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Middle Ages, the last attempt for several centuries to put the whole of English law into
a single text—in this case a summa, a genre of legal writing popular in the
universities.25 More importantly for the present discussion, it contains 527 references to
cases from the plea rolls.26 This has seemed significant to many of the people who have
looked at the treatise. Since case law is the basis of common law culture today, cases in
an English treatise of the thirteenth century resonate with those of us who have been
trained in common law systems. Bracton has thus, at times, been held up as the
beginning of the Anglo-American case law tradition. One lawyer-historian, speaking at
a meeting of lawyers in Hong Kong, called its author (he was apparently unaware that
it is currently thought to be the work of several authors) “the father of case law.”27
Bracton is not the entire story when it comes to case law, though. The authors of
that text were working within an established case-law tradition. In the 1220s and 1230s
a coterie of justices and clerks in the royal courts took the terse and dull administrative
documents that recorded the outcomes of cases—the plea rolls—and started reading
them as if they contained profound statements of legal principle. They made collections
of these case records, at least half a dozen of which existed by the middle of the

B. Rothman & Co. 1979) (1866), places Bracton in the context of the development of Roman law and the ius
commune in Europe, as a text that contributed to that development. The English-language literature on the
treatise has tended to focus on two issues: the authors’ political theories and whether they were good
Romanists or bad Romanists. See generally ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY 143–92 (1957); HERMANN KANTOROWICZ, BRACTONIAN PROBLEMS (1941);
H.G. RICHARDSON, BRACTON: THE PROBLEM OF HIS TEXT (1965); SELDEN SOC., SELECT PASSAGES FROM THE
WORKS OF BRACTON AND AZO (Frederic William Maitland ed., 1895); H. G. Richardson, Azo, Drogheda, and
Bracton, 59 ENG. HIST. REV. 22 (1944); H.G. Richardson, Tancred, Raymond, and Bracton, 59 ENG. HIST.
REV. 376 (1944); Brian Tierney, Bracton on Government, 38 SPECULUM 295 (1963); Paul Vinogradoff, The
Roman Elements in Bracton’s Treatise, 32 YALE L.J. 751 (1923); George E. Woodbine, The Roman Element in
Bracton’s De Aquirendo Rerum Dominio, 31 YALE L.J. 827 (1922).
In 1968, the Tulane Law Review ran a special issue on Bracton to commemorate the 700th anniversary of
Henry de Bratton’s death. See, e.g., Mitchell Franklin, Bracton, Para-Bractons(s) and the Vicarage of the
Roman Law, 42 TUL. L. REV. 455, 456 (discussing Bracton’s relevance to modern legal scholarship and
describing the scope of modern “Bractonian problems” as vast). Samuel Thorne published a complete edition
and translation of the treatise between 1968 and 1977. BRACTON, supra note 23. In his introduction to the third
volume, Thorne argued convincingly that the major writing on the treatise dates from the 1220s and 1230s, not
the 1250s and 1260s as previously thought, and that Henry de Bratton could not have been the author of the
earliest parts of the treatise. Samuel E. Thorne, Translator’s Introduction to BRACTON, supra note 23, at xiii.
The major work on Bracton since Thorne’s re-dating has been a debate between John Barton and Paul Brand
over the dating of the treatise. Compare John L. Barton, The Mystery of Bracton, 14 J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1993),
and John L. Barton, The Authorship of Bracton: Again, 30 J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (2009) with Paul Brand, The
Age of Bracton, in THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: CENTENARY ESSAYS ON ‘POLLOCK AND MAITLAND’ 65
(John Hudson ed., 1996), and Paul Brand, The Date and Authorship of Bracton: A Response, 31 J. LEGAL
HIST. 217 (2010).
25. The authors of Bracton call the work a summa in the introduction and also draw quite a bit of
material from the civilian jurist Azo of Bologna’s summae on the Institutes and the Codex. 2 BRACTON, supra
note 23, at 19, 46, 49.
26. Thomas Joseph McSweeney, Priests of Justice: Creating Law Out of Administration in ThirteenthCentury England 6 (July 26, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with Cornell
University Library).
27. T.L. Yang, Henry de Bracton: The Father of Case Law, in LAW LECTURES FOR PRACTITIONERS 211
(1987); see also Elizabeth Phillips, Introduction to LAW LECTURES FOR PRACTITIONERS, at v.
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century.28 Their patterns of thought were conditioned by the universities, and they
engaged with cases in the same ways canonists and civilians engaged with their
authorities, elevating the plea rolls from administrative records to legal literature in the
process. By tapping into the languages of authority and legitimacy they found in the
schools, the justices and clerks of the English king’s courts sought to turn themselves
into jurists like the ones they found in Roman and canon law texts, and to make the
argument that the type of administrative work they performed was different from, and
superior to, the types of administrative work performed by other royal servants: it was
law.
Although our modern case law descends from a later tradition of case literature,
the law report, there is some continuity between what these justices and clerks were
doing and the law report tradition. Modern case law thus bears some relation to the
civilian case law tradition of the thirteenth century. The earliest surviving examples of
law reports date from the late 1260s and are associated with the rise of the serjeants and
attorneys around that time—the first professional, private lawyers.29 Law reports were
probably written by a combination of court clerks, practicing lawyers, and aspiring
lawyers.30 Unlike the plea rolls, which were written in Latin and contained only
indirect discourse, the law reports were usually written in French, the vernacular of the
English elite, often contained what claimed to be verbatim quotations from the court
proceedings, and named the justices and serjeants who were speaking.31 Also, the
reports, unlike plea roll entries, often omitted the resolution of the case, creating an
aesthetic of debate rather than of authority.32 The differences between these two genres
of writing, however, have hidden the possibility that the law reports were inspired by
the plea roll collections of the thirteenth century. Indeed, some of the early law report
collections masquerade as plea roll collections.33 The law reports were later collected
into year books and are essentially continuous with our modern reporters.
The case collections made by these justices and clerks before the lawyers began to
write their law reports have been largely neglected. This is because the history of the
case as a literary genre in thirteenth-century England has been long-buried under the
weight of the history of Bracton. Until the 1970s, the story of case collecting in
thirteenth-century England was a relatively simple one: all of the existing case
collections had been made in preparation for Bracton. In the late nineteenth century,
the legal historian Paul Vinogradoff discovered a collection of 2,000 cases from the
plea rolls in the British Museum.34 Shortly thereafter, Frederick William Maitland, the

28. The most famous is British Library MS Add. 12269, which has been published as BRACTON’S NOTE
BOOK (photo. reprint 1999) (F. Maitland ed., 1887).
29. PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 63–65 (1992).
30. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 178–79 (4th ed. 2007); see Brand,
supra note 12, at 68–69 (discussing the use of law reports for legal training).
31. See, e.g., 1 THE EARLIEST ENGLISH LAW REPORTS 33–34 (Paul A. Brand ed., 1996) (c. 1284)
(providing an example of a law report of the late thirteenth century).
32. See generally id. at 1–36.
33. Cambridge Univ. Lib., Collection of Mixed Latin and French Law Reports, MS Dd.7.14, fols. 237v–
247v.
34. See A Letter of Paul Vinogradoff, THE ATHENAEUM (July 19, 1884), reprinted in 1 BRACTON’S
NOTE BOOK, supra note 28, at xvii (discussing British Museum MS Add. 12,269).
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grandfather of common law history, produced an edition of this case collection.35 After
finding some overlap between the cases in the treatise and those in this case collection,
Maitland decided that it was probably made at the instruction of Henry de Bratton to
use in selecting the cases to place in the treatise.36 He therefore dubbed the collection
Bracton’s Note Book.37 Note Book in hand, Maitland decided to take his research one
step further, and to go back to the plea rolls and find the original case records that were
copied into the Note Book.38 He found that someone had sidelined some cases, written
“volo” (“I want this”) next to others, and placed subject headings over others.39
Maitland believed that these were the instructions Henry de Bratton had left for his
scribes, telling them which cases to copy into the Note Book.40 The cases in Bracton,
the Note Book, and the marked rolls all came from the same two justices—Martin of
Pattishall and Martin’s own clerk-turned-justice, William of Ralegh. Henry de Bratton,
who Maitland believed to be the primary author of Bracton, was, in turn, Ralegh’s
clerk before he was a justice, and could have had access to the rolls of both Pattishall
and Ralegh. Maitland could therefore draw a straight line from marked plea rolls, to the
Note Book, to Bracton.41 Case collecting in thirteenth-century England was, according
to Maitland, all part of a single project and all the work of Henry de Bratton and his
small army of clerks.42 Case collections and marked rolls were not to be used on their
own, but were transitional texts, designed to create a finished work and then to be cast
aside. Maitland was humble about his assertions, though, asking at the end of his book
that someone prove him wrong.43
In 1977, Samuel Thorne did precisely that. In that year he published the third
volume of his edition and translation of Bracton and argued, compellingly, that
although Henry de Bratton probably wrote some later parts of the treatise, he could not
have been its primary author, since most of the work for the treatise was completed in
the 1220s and early 1230s, before Bratton had entered the royal courts.44 The treatise

35. See Fredrick William Maitland, Preface to 1 BRACTON’S NOTE BOOK, supra note 28, at vii–ix
(discussing the circumstances of Maitland’s publication).
36. Id. § 2, at 12–13.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 7, at 66.
39. Id. § 7, at 64–68.
40. Id. § 7, at 67.
41. Id. § 8, at 71–77.
42. See id. § 7, at 63–64.
43. Id. § 7, at 116–17.
44. The primary evidence for this earlier date is the treatise’s treatment of the provisions of the council
of Merton, which took place in 1236. Thorne, supra note 24, at xiii–xvi. The portions of the treatise that
discuss those provisions all appear to be in later additions or amendments to the primary text. Id. The first
chapter of the provisions was inserted into the text midsentence. Id. The second was inserted in the middle of a
long excerpt from the Glanvill treatise. Id. The fourth was inserted in a place in the treatise where it contradicts
the text that comes directly before it. Id. In addition to the evidence from the council of Merton, there are other
bits of evidence that point to an earlier date of composition. The treatise contains many writs, all but one of
which have limitation dates that were not in force after 1237. Id. at xxviii.
There is evidence that the treatise might date to even earlier than 1236. For example, the treatise states
that a demandant could bring a writ of novel disseisin not only against the original disseisor but also against
his heirs. Id. at xxiii. Under later thirteenth-century law, such a demandant would have to bring a writ of entry,
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was most likely written by a series of authors, beginning with William of Ralegh and
ending with Henry de Bratton, over a period of forty years.45 More to our purpose,
Thorne also showed that the Note Book was not the source for most of the cases in the
treatise, and that the marked rolls were probably not used to make the Note Book.46 The
Note Book, the marked rolls, and Bracton were all separate projects.
If these were separate projects, then there were at least half a dozen independent
collections of cases circulating in the early- to mid-thirteenth century. Where
Maitland’s narrative hid case collecting behind Bracton, we can see now that case
collecting was a phenomenon that lasted from the early decades of the thirteenth
century until at least the 1260s.47 There seem to have been several people, forming a
circle around Martin of Pattishall and William of Ralegh, who thought that cases were
important. But, if the clerks and justices of the courts were not making these collections
in preparation for Bracton, why were they making them?
Although Bracton has obfuscated the existence of the case collection as an
independent genre of legal writing, it is a valuable source for understanding how the
people who were collecting cases read and engaged with them as texts. The case
collections themselves give us little insight into their purpose. None of the existing
collections contains any extensive commentary or even an introduction. Bracton, on the
other hand, is mostly composed of commentary. Although the authors of Bracton
comment on the role of the case references only briefly, we can learn quite a bit about
the role the case references played in the treatise from their placement relative to other
parts of the text and by the ways the authors of the treatise introduce them. Bracton can
thus serve as a sort of key for understanding how the people who were collecting cases
in the thirteenth century understood those cases.
Bracton is particularly useful for decoding the plea roll collections because the
collections and the treatise were almost certainly made by the same small, but
important, group of people. As previously noted, the people collecting cases in the first
half of the thirteenth century focused on the rolls of the justices Martin of Pattishall and
William of Ralegh.48 Pattishall’s and Ralegh’s rolls would not have been easy to
access. They would probably have been available only to their clerks and other people
close to them. We know that one clerk in particular had at least some of their rolls in
his possession in 1258.49 In that year, Henry de Bratton, Ralegh’s former clerk and by
because novel disseisin could lie only against the original disseisor. Id. at xxiv. Thorne thought that this was
the rule by 1230 at the latest, meaning that, unless the author of the treatise took a minority view of this matter,
this part of the treatise was written in the 1220s or earlier. Id. The treatise also gives two opinions on the issue
of whether a free woman who was married to a villein was barred from suing for her land held in free tenure
during her husband’s life. Id. at xxvii. Martin of Pattishall changed the earlier law, barring her from bringing
such a suit, in 1227, hinting that people were working on the treatise before and after 1227, again, assuming
that that author adopted Pattishall’s view of the matter. Id.
45. Id. at xxxvi.
46. Id. at xxxiv–xxxvi.
47. The Collection titled Casus et Judicia dates from the 1260s. CASUS PLACITORUM AND REPORTS OF
CASES IN THE KING’S COURTS 1272–1278, at lxxv–lxxxiv (William Huse Dunham, Jr. ed., Selden Soc’y No.
69, 1952); Brit. Lib. MS Add. 35179, fols. 36–39.
48. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases included in Bracton.
49. See ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN EYRE BEING THE ROLLS OF PLEAS AND ASSIZES FOR LINCOLNSHIRE
1218–19 AND WORCESTERSHIRE 1221, at xix–xx (Doris Mary Stenton ed., 1934) (indicating that Bratton kept
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this time a justice himself, was instructed to return Pattishall’s and Ralegh’s rolls to the
treasury.50 Bratton could not have been the influence behind the case collecting culture,
since some of the plea roll collections and parts of Bracton were written before he
began working in the courts; but he does provide us with evidence that the case
collecting tradition was located in the circle of Martin of Pattishall and William of
Ralegh.51 If the earliest case collections and the earliest portions of the treatise are
dated correctly, the project began during Martin of Pattishall’s tenure as chief justice,
while Ralegh was his senior clerk, continued during Ralegh’s tenure, and was further
continued by Ralegh’s clerks, who included Henry de Bratton and the future chief
justice Roger of Thurkilby.52 It was this group of maybe a dozen justices and clerks
who first thought to collect cases for something other than the bureaucratic facts
contained in them, and, more than likely, were the individuals who wrote Bracton.
In Bracton, then, we can start to understand how the clerks and justices engaged
with these cases; as we shall see, they engaged with them in the same way the civilians
of their time engaged with the writings of Roman jurists. They show signs that they
subscribed to the same peculiar notion of authority as the jurists in the schools, and
they used dialectical reasoning to create new legal knowledge. Bracton thus raises the
possibility that the most “English” of legal institutions—case law—was not a purely
English development, but a combination of English administrative practice with civillaw thought. The common law tradition thus may owe its most recognizable type of
legal literature to its most important rival: the civilian, or Roman law, tradition.
B.

The Plea Rolls: Unlikely Case Law

It is rather remarkable that in the thirteenth century English judges began to read,
write, and copy cases as if they were a didactic literature, particularly in light of
England’s case tradition at the time: the plea rolls. Plea rolls at the beginning of the
thirteenth century were administrative records. They did not look much different from
the pipe rolls—recording payments to and from the Exchequer—or from the somewhat
later patent or close rolls, which recorded the king’s correspondence.53 There were a
few fairly standard forms that plea roll entries could take. Entries recording court
appearances to begin litigation or to appoint an attorney might take up only a few lines.
We can see some similarities in style among early plea roll entries, as in this fairly
typical entry from 1199:
Buckinghamshire—Robert son of David seeks against Lefwine the merchant
two acres of meadow with appurtenances in Aylesbury, which David the
father of the aforesaid Robert, as he says, gaged to the aforesaid Lefwine for
a term which has ended. Alan the son of Lefwine, having been put in his

his rolls from his days as a clerk until they were demanded of him). This is not particularly surprising, since a
“judge’s personal clerk would naturally have charge of his master’s rolls,” and “[t]here would be nothing
surprising in his possession of a great many at once.” Id. at xix.
50. Id. at xx. Leicester Abbey was instructed to return Stephen of Segrave’s rolls at the same time. Id.
51. Thorne, supra note 24, at xxxi.
52. TURNER, supra note 6, at 216–17.
53. M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND, 1066–1307, at 68–69, 92
(Blackwell Publishers, 2d ed. 1993) (1979).
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[Lefwine’s] place, seeks the view. Let the view be had. A day is given to him
from Easter day in one month: Meanwhile let the view be made.54
This entry combines several elements, which could appear in one entry or several.
First, we find out where this case arose. The clerk tells us, by way of an abbreviation in
the margin, that the case comes from Buckinghamshire. Second, the scribe records
Robert’s claim for relief. He tells us who the parties are: Robert, who seeks the land,
and Lefwine, who holds it. He tells us how much land—two acres—and what kind of
land—pasture—the demandant is claiming. Most entries tell us what kind of writ the
demandant brought to begin the case. This one does not do so explicitly, although we
can guess from the relatively standard form that it takes that Robert brought a writ of
right. After the phrase indicating the type of writ, we get a little bit of information
pertinent to the case. Robert’s father, David, had held the land and had gaged it to
Lefwine’s father at some point in the past.
All of that is contained in the first sentence of the entry. The second sentence does
something slightly different, and could have been included in a second entry if done at
a later sitting of the court. It tells us that Lefwine’s son, Alan, would be acting in
Lefwine’s place, as his attorney, and would have the power to bind him. It also tells us
about the first action Alan took as his father’s representative: he requested that the
parties view the land in question. The last few clauses tell us about the process the
judges ordered. They scheduled a day for the case to be heard and ordered that the
parties view the land before that date.
The entry is very informative, but it does not look much like an opinion by
Learned Hand or Oliver Wendell Holmes. Because this is an administrative entry,
economy is the aesthetic, and much is left implicit. This entry tells us about the parties
and the law only incidentally to telling us about the mechanics of the case. Why did
David gage the land to Lefwine? How long ago? What was the term of the gage? How
long ago did it expire? What steps did Robert take before he came to court to try to
recover the land? What law is applicable to the case? None of these questions are
answered in the fifty-three words of the entry. The court is concerned with the bare
bones of the case and with what it told the parties at the end of it; it is concerned with
what is going to matter when the court hears the case again.
III. THE CASES IN BRACTON
A.

Cases and Authority

Bracton contains 527 references to plea roll entries, often indicating where to find
the case in the roll itself.55 In this Section, I show that, contrary to what earlier scholars
have said about the cases, their role in the treatise is as authoritative legal texts.

54. “Buk’.—Robertus filius Davidi petit versus Lefwinum Mercatorem ij. acras prati cum pertinenciis in
Ailesberi, quas David pater predicti Roberti, ut dicit, invadiavit predicto Lefwino ad terminum qui preteriit:
Alanus filius Lefwini positus loco ejus petit visum inde. Habeat visum. Dies datus est eis a die Pasche in j.
mensem: et interim fiat visus.” 1 CURIA REGIS ROLLS OF THE REIGNS OF RICHARD I. AND JOHN, PRESERVED IN
THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 102 (1922) (translation by author).
55. See, e.g., 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 346 (referencing “the end of the roll”).
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Theodore Plucknett tried to explain the role of the cases in light of what he saw as a
“crisis of authority” in the early common law, that judges and clerks in the royal courts
were looking for their own equivalent to the decrees of emperors and popes that Roman
and canon law used as their authorities.56 According to Plucknett, they found their
equivalent in writs, not in plea roll entries.57 Plucknett believed that the authors of
Bracton did think of the cases in the treatise as authorities, but, in his opinion, the cases
in Bracton were “scientific or intellectual authorities” rather than “formal authorities
binding upon the courts”; meaning by this that, unlike modern judicial opinions, they
were “useful illustrations but not in themselves sources of law.”58 According to
Plucknett, the authors placed them in the treatise to show how legal doctrines worked
in practice, not to bolster the authority of those doctrines.59
Fredric Cheyette, in an excellent article on custom in thirteenth century law,
argued that the authors of Bracton were taking a Roman and canon law approach to the
problem of authority, but he took a different position on how the authors solved that
problem.60 For Cheyette, custom was the key. Cheyette compared discussions of
custom in Roman and canon law treatises and in Bracton and made an entirely
plausible argument that the authors of Bracton structured their theory of authority
around Roman and canon law doctrines of custom.61 Custom had a force of its own in
the two laws; there is authority supporting the view that even a papal decretal could not
override a local custom unless it did so explicitly.62 By custom, though, the canonists
and civilians did not mean an inchoate set of practices. Custom only obtained legal
force when some higher authority gave its stamp of approval to that custom.63 When a
court had spoken on a custom, the court’s judgment proved that the custom existed and,
at the same time, transformed it into a legal rule.64 Customary law, then, is custom that
has been approved by the king or pope through his judges.
Custom was not the primary source of law to the canonists or civilians. The
primary sources were legislative or juristic: the decrees of popes, emperors and
councils, and the opinions of the church fathers and important jurists, the texts that
could be found in the authoritative collections of law such as Justinian’s Codex and
Digest.65 Cheyette argues that, since English law had no such collections of authority,
the justices and clerks who wrote Bracton turned to custom to fill in their law; but it
was the positive-law custom of the schools to which they turned.66 Thus, the cases in

56. T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, EARLY ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE 24–33 (1958).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 59, 80.
59. See id. at 58–60 (stating that Bracton authors drew on the quality of intellectual authority contained
in the cases, not any legal formalism).
60. Fredric L. Cheyette, Custom, Case Law, and Medieval “Constitutionalism”: A Re-examination, 78
POL. SCI. Q. 362, 379–80 (1963).
61. Id. at 379–89.
62. Id. at 379.
63. Id. at 379–82. Bracton distinguished between local customs and the more important customs of the
royal court. Id. at 378, 381.
64. Id. at 379.
65. See generally id.
66. Id. at 377–78.
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Bracton serve to prove custom, which in this case means the customs that have the
king’s approval.
At stake in this debate is whether the cases in Bracton are really case law or not.
Plucknett thought not.67 For Plucknett, the case illustrated a legal point that was fully
independent of the case itself. For Cheyette, cases were case law.68 They were
moments when a body empowered by the king breathed life into a custom and made it
a binding rule. I present a third possibility. The cases in Bracton were indeed case law
of a sort. The authors of the treatise collected cases because they were thinking like
civilians and canonists. But they were not using cases because they were statements of
custom. They were using them because cases were, in the eyes of the clerks of the
courts, the words of great jurists. The authors of the treatise imagined the royal justice
as the equivalent of the Roman jurist, a figure they encountered in the Digest, a text
which recorded the opinions of jurists of the classical period of Roman law.69 The
authors of Bracton, who we can be certain had legal training in the schools, exported
this image to the justices they worked with and served. They began to imagine the royal
justice not as an administrator, but as a jurist. The plea roll entry thus became important
as a place where the jurist-justice’s words could be found. It was as juristic opinions,
not as proof of custom or as mere illustrations, that the authors of Bracton engaged
with plea roll entries.
B.

Authority Words

It is hard to tell from most of the case references why the Bracton authors chose to
place those specific citations in their text. A minority of references, though, show us
that the authors understood the cases in a very different way than either Plucknett or
Cheyette thought. The problem with Plucknett’s argument in particular is that it is an
argument from absence. As he sees it, the case references in the treatise need not be
more than illustrations.70 If there is an example to the contrary, however, where the
case or the judge can only have been included as an authority, Plucknett’s argument
from absence is less secure. There are more than a few places in the treatise where the
authors indicate to us that the case is more authoritative than Plucknett would have us
believe; that they are indeed the authors’ English equivalent to decretals or, more to the
point, to the opinions of Roman jurists that we find in the Digest.
The words that introduce case references are important for understanding the
ways that the authors and thirteenth-century readers of the treatise would have
understood those cases. Whereas most of the references leave the relationship between
case and rule ambiguous, a few show us that the authors of the treatise undoubtedly
thought that cases were authoritative texts from which general rules could be
abstracted. Unfortunately, the vast majority of case references are introduced by the
words ut (as) or sicut (just as), which give us very little to go on when trying to
67. PLUCKNETT, supra note 56, at 80.
68. See Cheyette, supra note 60, at 379–81 (noting that “Bracton realized that the rules of English law
were to be found in past judgments” and that “‘custom’ was the proper term for it”).
69. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 43–44 (1999).
70. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 56, at 80 (stating that the cases in Bracton are useful but not “sources of
law”).
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understand the function served by the cases. For example, one author tells us “[d]ower
may be constituted not only in lands and tenements acquired but in those to be
acquired, if they are acquired or fall in during the life of the husband, as [ut] of Easter
term in the seventh year of king Henry in the county of Somerset, concerning Emma,
wife of William Dacy.”71 We can break this sentence into two halves, separated by the
word as (ut). The first half states a general rule and the second names a case decided in
court. The text tells us that the rule appears in this treatise as it does in Emma’s case.
But what does that mean? Does the case illustrate the point? Or does it do something
more? We cannot tell from this entry. Phrases like “matter may be found in,” “there is
matter in,” “as happened,” and “as is shown” carry little more meaning than the
ubiquitous ut, implying only that the rule stated above can also be found in a plea roll
entry.72
In some instances, though, the authors of the treatise introduce case references
with normative prescriptions. “Ought” words (from the verb debere) are often used in
combination with the introduction to the case reference: “And that she ought not to
have dower can be found in Hilary term in the seventeenth year of King Henry.”73 The
impression the author gives us here is that the case is not merely an illustration of what
to do in a particular procedural situation. Rather, the case states a rule that ought to be
followed. We have a similar situation with, “that this is so you have” or “that this is so
may be seen,” both of which indicate that there is some normative value behind the
statement the author has just made and make the plea roll the locus of that normative
rule.74 The reader is engaged to seek out the text in which the rule or principle resides,
which will show him that “this is so.”75
We start to see that the cases must be more than mere illustrations when we move
on to the very explicit authority words that introduce some of the case references. In

71. “Item constitui potest dos non tantum in terris et tenementis perquisitis, sed etiam perquirendis, si
perquisita fuerint vel acciderint in vita viri, ut de termino Paschæ anno regis Henrici septimo, comitatu
Somersetiæ, de Emma quæ fuit uxor Willelmi Dacy.” 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 268 (footnotes omitted).
72. There are some cases, introduced by phrases like “as was done,” “it was said” (dictum fuit), and “you
have” (habetis) that tell us something slightly more than the introductory phrases above. E.g., 2 BRACTON,
supra note 23, at 94, 238; 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 123. All three imply actors in a way that the previous
examples do not. “As was done” and “it was said” imply that the aforementioned rule comes from the deed or
speech of someone in the case that follows. “You have” implies a different sort of actor: the reader. It implies
that there is something in the plea roll to be had that is not to be had in the treatise itself, and that the reader
may in fact want to have. Apart from giving us some indication that the intended audience of the treatise was
composed of people who had access to the rolls—judges and clerks in the royal courts—this phrase hints that,
in the case references, there is something that the treatise does not provide and that might be found outside of
it. None of these tell us exactly why it is important to know what was done or said or why we would want to
have the material from the plea rolls. These types of introductory words need not imply any more than that
cases are illustrations. But they do point, first of all, to the need to know what happened in past cases and,
secondly, to the importance of reading the plea roll record itself.
73. “Et quod dotem habere non debeat, inveniri poterit de termino Sancti Hillarii anno regis Henrici
septimo decimo . . . . ” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 361; see also 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 29, 321, 361,
403.
74. “[Q]uod ita sit habetis . . . .” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 371 (emphasis added). “[Q]uod ita sit
videri . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
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one case, which we will examine in more detail later,76 a rule is said to be “proved in
the last eyre of Martin of Pattishall in the county of Suffolk, an assise of mortdancestor
beginning ‘If Ralph of Wadleysham.’”77 The author of this passage makes the
relationship between the rule and the case explicit in a way he does not in the entries
that begin with “ut.”78 He tells us directly that the case proves the rule. This is not an
isolated case. The author uses the verb probare to connect the rule to the subsequent
plea roll entry forty-six times in the received text of the treatise, that is, in just under
nine percent of the entries.79
Several cases use debere (the ought verb) together with probare to show us that
the case represents the author’s own view. For instance, in one part of the treatise, the
author tells us: “And that the warrantor ought to be demanded that it may be known
what right he has in the two parts, is proved [in the roll] of Michaelmas term in the
fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth years of king Henry in the county of
Warwick, [the case] of John the son of Elfric.”80 The author follows this with a brief
description of the facts of the case, which he ends by saying, “Whereupon it was clear
(manifesta) that the woman demandant could not have dower, because the heir of her
husband had no right in the two parts.”81 The author states the rule in ought terms and
then says that it is proved by the case.82 He then tells us that the result in the case was
clear. The text gives us every indication that the rule as stated in the case is the correct
rule. In addition to meaning to prove or to approve, probare could mean to test in
medieval Latin—particularly in the context of trials by battle and ordeal.83 But if
probatur means “is tested” in this passage, then the author seems to believe that the test
had positive results. It is more likely that the word, as the Bracton authors use it, means
something closer to prove. This comes through even more strongly when we are told
that it “is proved from the eyre of William of Ralegh” that a person holding land for a
term of years may vouch the lord to warrant it, “although there may be an argument
[ratio] to the contrary.”84 The author here seems to doubt the principle the case states,
because it is contrary to some ratio, which can mean both “argument” and “reason,”

76. See infra note 126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case of Martin of Pattishall.
77. “Item quod . . . probatur in ultimo itinere Martini de Pateshilla in comitatu Suffolciæ, assisa mortis
antecessoris, si Radulfus de Wadleghesham.” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 209 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 360 (“[S]ecundum quod probatur in ultimo itinere Martini de
Pateshilla in comitatu Lincolniæ . . . .”).
80. “Et quod warantus exigi debet ut sciri possit quid iuris habuerit in duabus partibus, probatur de
termino Sancti Michælis anno regis Henrici quarto decimo incipiente quinto decimo comitatu Warrewickiæ,
de Iohanne filio Elfridi . . . .” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 360.
81. “Et unde ibi manifestum fuit quod mulier petens dotem habere non potuit, quia heres viri sui nihil
iuris habuit in duabus partibus.” Id.
82. Id.
83. 12 D.R. HOWLETT ET AL., DICTIONARY OF MEDIEVAL LATIN FROM BRITISH SOURCES: FASCICULE XI,
PHI-POS (2008).
84. “Et quod ille potest qui tenet ad terminum, quamvis ratio se habeat in contrarium, probatur de
itinere Willelmi de Ralegha in comitatu Warrewickiæ, de quadam Sibilla quæ dotem petiit, circa finem rotuli.”
4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 193 (footnotes omitted).
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and yet believes that the case proves the point.85 This would be truly odd if he was
using the case as a mere illustration of his point.86 The case must, therefore, have some
authority on its own, apart from the fact that it is reasonable or that it is in line with the
author’s own opinion; it can help the author overcome his doubts about the rule’s
rationality. If a case can overcome reason, it must have a strong authoritative power.
C.

Scholasticism and the Dialectic

Pace Plucknett, we have seen the evidence that the authors of the treatise thought
that the cases in it were more than mere illustrations. None of the evidence above,
however, would cut against Cheyette’s thesis that the cases are authorities in the sense
that they give the royal imprimatur to custom, that is, that they confirm and prove
custom and, in the process, turn it into binding law.87 The cases in the treatise do not
read like proof of existing custom, however. The discourses the authors use for talking
about cases are instead of the kind that scholars in the universities used to talk about
their authorities: scripture, the words of the Church fathers, the pronouncements of
popes and emperors, and, most importantly for present purposes, the works of jurists.
In this Section, I show that the Bracton authors used cases because they had
adopted civilian attitudes about harmony and authority. The twelfth and thirteenth
centuries were a time of rapid change in education in Europe; new methods of
argumentation were being taught in the cathedral schools and, later, in Europe’s first
universities. Starting in the twelfth century, scholars began to organize knowledge into
systems that were internally coherent.88 As the foundation of their systems of
knowledge, scholars looked to ancient texts, to which they ascribed a peculiar type of
authority. Different texts acquired this authoritative status in different fields. In
theology, the Bible, obviously, but also the writings of the church fathers and the
Sentences of Peter Lombard had acquired this status by the early thirteenth century.89
In canon law, Gratian’s twelfth-century Decretum would become an authority.90 In

85. 2 J.F. NIERMEYER & C. VAN DE KIEFT, MEDIAE LATINITATIS LEXICON MINUS 1151–52 (2d rev. ed.
2002) (1976); CHARLTON T. LEWIS & CHARLES SHORT, LATIN DICTIONARY 1525–27 (photo. reprint 1966)
(1879).
86. We see something similar in an addicio that must have been added by a later author, because it seeks
to distance itself from the addicio that comes immediately before it. The author of this later addicio claims that
the principle that is found in the previous addicio is “true according to R. and others. But to the contrary [the
roll] of Michaelmas term in the second and the beginning of the third years of king Henry son of king John, in
the county of Kent, [the case] of Matilda daughter of Simon.” 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 274 (“Et hæc vera
sunt secundum R. et alios. Sed contra de termino Sancti Michælis anno regis Henrici filii regis Iohannis
secundo incipiente tertio comitatu Cantiæ, de Matillide filia Simonis.” (footnotes omitted)). The author’s
distancing technique—“according to R. and others”—combined with the use of a case to bolster the other
opinion suggests that the author held the contrary opinion and that the case has some sort of normative value in
determining what the proper rule should be.
87. Cheyette, supra note 60, at 379.
88. CHARLES M. RADDING & WILLIAM W. CLARK, MEDIEVAL ARCHITECTURE, MEDIEVAL LEARNING:
BUILDERS AND MASTERS IN THE AGE OF ROMANESQUE AND GOTHIC 85 (1992); R.W. SOUTHERN, THE MAKING
OF THE MIDDLE AGES 204 (1953).
89. JOHN MARENBON, MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION
213–14 (2007).
90. ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN’S DECRETUM 1–2, 191 (2000).
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Roman law, it was Justinian’s monumental collections: the Institutes, the Codex, and
especially the Digest.91 Medieval scholars read these works because their authors were
thought to have had some special light. As A.J. Minnis has pointed out, the scholastic
idea of authority was circular: “an [authority] was a book worth reading.”92 Through a
probably less-than-conscious process, the collective community of scholars had
ascribed worth to particular authors, much in the same way we create and perpetuate
literary canons today. No one questioned that Justinian was an authority.
According to the scholars of the thirteenth century, authorities should, ideally, not
conflict with each other. Jurists in the civil and canon law faculties emphasized the
harmony of authorities. The book that established canon law as an academic discipline
in the universities, Gratian’s Decretum, was titled, in full, The Concordance of
Discordant Canons (Concordia Discordantium Canonum).93 Gratian took seemingly
contradictory decrees of councils and popes, along with statements of the church
fathers, and not only placed them beside each other but offered solutions to the
contradictions.94 Indeed, in the civil law, this kind of thinking about the foundational
texts that were at the center of legal training—Justinian’s Institutes, Digest, and
Codex—was aided by the fact that the Digest, the most studied of the three in the
medieval universities, explicitly said in its prologue that it did not contradict itself:
Nothing contradictory will claim a place for itself or be found in this book, if
anyone will examine the reasons for the difference with a subtle mind. But
something new or secretly placed will be found, which dissolves the
complaint of dissonance and introduces another nature, fleeing the bounds of
discord.95
To see how this system worked, let us look at one case where Gratian, in his
Decretum, takes several authorities that seem to conflict and creates a harmonious set
of doctrines out of them. In his thirty-sixth causa, Gratian highlights a major issue in
the law of marriage: the question of whether the man who commits raptus—an act
which, at the time, primarily referred to carrying a woman off without her father’s
permission—can later marry the woman he has abducted. To discuss this issue, Gratian
lines up a series of authorities interspersed with bits of commentary explaining how
they relate to each other. In his first string of authorities, Gratian quotes three church
councils, letters written by the popes Symmachus and Gregory the Great, and the
writings of Jovinian, all of which say explicitly that the ravisher cannot marry his
victim.96 One would think that Gratian wants his reader to come to the conclusion that

91. STEIN, supra note 69, at 46.
92. A.J. MINNIS, MEDIEVAL THEORY OF AUTHORSHIP: SCHOLASTIC LITERARY ATTITUDES IN THE LATER
MIDDLE AGES 12 (Edward Peters ed., 2d ed. 2010).
93. GRATIANUS, CONCORDIA DISCORDANTIUM CANONUM (DECRETUM), in CORPUS IURIS CANONICI (E.
Friedberg ed. 1879); see also JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 47 (1995).
94. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 93, at 47–48 (noting that Gratian’s purpose was to “reconcile differing
canonical traditions and prescriptions into an intellectually consistent and unified system”).
95. “Contrarium autem aliquid in hoc codice positum nullum sibi locum vindicabit nec invenitur, si quis
subtili animo diversitatis rationes excutiet: sed est aliquid novum inventum vel occulte positum, quod
dissonantiae querellam dissoluit et aliam naturam inducit discordiae fines effugientem.” DIG. (Justinian,
Constitutio Tanta, 15) (translation by author).
96. GRATIANUS, supra note 93, at C.36 q.2 c.1–6.
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such a marriage is forbidden; but Gratian’s commentary at the end of this string of six
cases tells a different story. Gratian distinguishes these cases and tells us that they
apply to a specific circumstance. He contends that, in all of these cases, the marriage
was forbidden because “the ravisher did not wish to marry the woman he carried off,”
although there is no textual basis in any of them for this interpretation.97 Gratian thus
avoids open disagreement with these authorities. He simply tells us that they do not say
what the reader might, at first glance, think they say: that a ravisher cannot marry the
woman he abducted. In these cases, he did not want to marry her, and thus he could not
be forced to. Therefore, the cases are not directly pertinent to the question of whether
the ravisher can marry the woman he has taken away from her father.
After these six authorities, Gratian presents another authority without comment—
an authority who seems to represent his opinion. Gratian gives us a quote from Jerome,
who said that “there are three legitimate marriages written about in scripture,” two of
which are marriages between a ravisher and his abductee.98 Following this, he presents
three more texts. The first describes the case where the father consents to the marriage,
and, in agreement with Jerome, posits that such a marriage is legitimate. Gratian does
not comment on this text.99 The second, a short text from Ambrose on payments to the
woman’s father, which says that the couple will remain married, likewise elicits no
comment from Gratian.100 The third, a text from the Council of Meaux, is more
troubling for Gratian, and he writes a commentary on it that is longer than the primary
text.101 The council initially said that if there are any ravisher-ravishee couples who
have not, at the time of the council, already been wed, they should be separated
immediately and not be allowed to marry in the future.102 The council then made a
small concession, holding that such a couple, if they had both done public penance and
if “age has driven out incontinence,” could marry. The council heavily qualifies its
permission, however, stating, “in this we have not constituted a rule, but . . . we
observe what is rather more tolerable,” hardly a ringing endorsement for such a
marriage.103 The council tells us that the general rule here is that the couple cannot
marry, with the proviso that under certain special circumstances they can. Gratian turns
the reasoning of the council on its head, however, when he titles this text, “Licit
marriages are conceded to the ravisher and the woman carried off after penance,”
focusing his attention on the limited permission granted in the second half of the text
rather than on the blanket prohibition in the first half.104 Where the council laid down a
general rule that such a couple could not marry and a limited set of conditions under
which they could, Gratian understands the permission to marry as a general rule, and
the penance requirement as a minor condition placed upon that rule.

97. “His auctoritatibus evidenter datur intellegi, quod raptor in uxorem rapta ducere non valet.” Id. at
C.3 q.2 post c.6.
98. Id. at C.36 q.2 c.7.
99. Id. at C.36 q.2 c.8.
100. Id. at C.36 q.2 c.9.
101. Id. at C.36 q.2 c.10.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Gratian does not continue his streak of selective reading, however, when he
arrives at a text from the Council of Aachen, which says explicitly that men who have
carried off women cannot marry them “although they have afterwards come to
agreement, or given dower to them, or have accepted marriage with the consent of their
parents.”105 He does not find a way to reconcile this opinion with Jerome’s. According
to Gratian, “this authority does not prejudice the authority of Jerome,” though, since
Jerome’s opinion “depends on the testimony of divine law.”106 Unsure of how to
reconcile the texts, Gratian takes the easy way out and simply says that the Council of
Aachen was wrong.
Brian Tierney uses this passage as an example of a place where Gratian chooses
one of his authorities over others.107 The medieval law faculties did not follow their
authorities blindly and did at times feel free to reject certain texts in favor of others, as
Gratian does here.108 But although Gratian clearly prefers Jerome’s rule and selects it
over all of the other authorities in this passage, this is not what he tells us he is
doing.109 Gratian instead tries to convince us that all of these authorities—except, of
course, the Council of Aachen—come to the same conclusion on the general point that,
ordinarily, a ravisher may marry the woman he has stolen from her family. If Gratian
did feel free to choose his rules based on the substance, not the source, he did it in a
way that showed his respect for the source as an authority. He could not simply say that
Jerome was right and the other auctoritates were wrong. He instead did his best to
reconcile them, even when it is fairly obvious to the modern reader that the passages do
not say what he wanted them to say.
This process of reconciliation serves an important function in Gratian’s text,
beyond showing that authorities do not conflict: it creates new knowledge. Gratian
never tells us explicitly what he thinks the answer is. He clearly thinks that Jerome’s
opinion is correct, that such a couple can wed, but he does not reject the other texts.
Rather, he reads them as exceptions or qualifications to the general rule. These ancient
auctoritates can be made to accord with Jerome and can help us to flesh out what
Jerome means. The first series of authorities show us that although the ravisher can
marry the ravishee, he cannot be forced to do so. The Council of Meaux shows us that
the couple must do penance before they wed. By bringing the texts into harmony with
each other, Gratian creates new legal rules out of what appeared to be an irreconcilable
mess of contradictory opinions.110
Gratian wrote in the mode of reconciliation, the mode in which scholastic lawyers
were most comfortable, and used it to refine legal rules. Although legal authorities
could be wrong, scholars in the law faculties strove to find a way in which all of the
authorities that spoke on a particular point could be right and to thus create a workable
105. Id. at C.36 q.2 c.11.
106. Id.
107. Brian Tierney, “Only the Truth has Authority”: The Problem of “Reception” in the Decretists and
in Johannes de Turrecremata, in LAW, CHURCH, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STEPHAN KUTTNER 69,
79 (Kenneth Pennington & Robert Somerville eds., 1977).
108. Id. at 80–81.
109. Id. at 79.
110. See STEPHAN G. KUTTNER, HARMONY FROM DISSONANCE: AN INTERPRETATION OF MEDIEVAL
CANON LAW 10–12 (1960).
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system of law out of a cacophony of texts. This creation of new knowledge out of old
authorities was not unique to Gratian. Hand in hand with the scholars’ emphasis on
harmony was their use of the dialectical method. As early as the 1150s, John of
Salisbury complained that dialectic was taking over in the schools to the detriment of
rhetoric and grammar (the other two parts of the trivium, the first round of studies in
medieval schools).111 Where rhetoric seeks to convince the speaker’s audience to adopt
the speaker’s own opinions, dialectic seeks to find truth by putting two people with
differing viewpoints in conversation, with the ultimate goal being a synthesis between
the two initially divergent viewpoints.112 One of the major teaching methods in the
universities, the quaestio, pitted apparently contradictory authorities against each other
and challenged students to reconcile them.113 Medieval scholars thus used dialectical
reasoning to reconcile the opinions of authorities that seemed to conflict with each
other and to bring harmony to the system.
Medieval dialectic used authorities as a starting point. Contrary to popular belief,
it was not Sir Isaac Newton who first said that we are dwarfs standing on the shoulders
of giants. It was rather a phrase John of Salisbury attributed to his teacher Bernard of
Chartres in the twelfth century, and described the twelfth- and thirteenth-century
attitude toward scholarship.114 The authorities studied by the medieval schoolmen
constituted the foundation of knowledge, but they were a foundation that could be built
upon because, as John said, “we can see more and farther than our predecessors, not
because we have keener vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne
aloft on their gigantic stature.”115 By working out the apparent contradictions of the
fathers, the jurists, or the Bible, medieval scholars were able to see farther and lead
people to a greater understanding of old knowledge. By positing that the system had to
be a harmonious whole and resolving the cruxes of apparent conflict, scholars actually
innovated, creating an interesting dynamic between authority and creativity, just as
Gratian had done in expounding on the ravisher’s marriage.116
Dialectical reasoning was not just an epistemological strategy. It was, at the same
time, a didactic strategy. It was an efficient way to teach because it pointed out the
problems in a particular field. Peter Abelard, in his Sic et Non (“Yes and No”), for
instance, juxtaposed snippets of writings from the church fathers that seemed to
conflict with each other.117 But he also provided students with a guide for using
dialectical reasoning to reconcile texts with each other so they could use Sic et Non as a

111. JOHN OF SALISBURY, THE METALOGICON OF JOHN OF SALISBURY: A TWELFTH-CENTURY DEFENSE
VERBAL AND LOGICAL ARTS OF THE TRIVIUM 93–95 (Daniel D. McGarry trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
1955) (c. 1159).
112. Id. at 102.
113. See MARENBON, supra note 89, at 160.
114. JOHN OF SALISBURY, supra note 111, at 167.
115. Id.
116. SOUTHERN, supra note 88, at 206–07.
117. PETER ABAILARD, SIC ET NON: A CRITICAL EDITION 89–104 (Blanche B. Boyer & Richard McKeon
eds., 1977).
OF THE
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sort of workbook.118 Peter Lombard likewise wrote his Sentences in order to create a
shortcut to the major problems in theology.119 His goal was to show where the
authoritative texts conflicted so that students could find them quickly without spending
a lifetime poring over volumes of the writings of the fathers, looking for apparent
contradictions to reconcile.120 Dialectic was a way of getting to the heart of the matter.
The quintessential product of this type of thirteenth-century thought was the
summa, a text which sought both to point out the major areas of debate within a field
and to reconcile the various opinions in order to present the whole of that field’s
knowledge as a coherent system.121 Its logic assumes that the system of authorities is
complete and contains everything necessary for any situation that might arise, much as
the modern civil law code does.122 In fact, the authors of Bracton relied heavily on the
summae of the Bolognese civilian Azo and called their own work a summa in imitation
of Azo.123
D.

Cases and Dialectical Reasoning

There are several case references in Bracton that show that the authors of that
treatise were thinking like university trained civilians and canonists. They were treating
cases from the plea rolls—particularly those of Martin of Pattishall and William of
Ralegh—as authorities and using those authorities as a base on which to build a legal
system. They used dialectic to reconcile cases to each other and to show that the legal
system was in harmony. Although the dialectical reasoning in the treatise is not always
as sophisticated as that in the most learned civil and canon law summae, the authors of
Bracton, justices and clerks of the royal courts, thought of themselves as using the
same tools as the people in the universities.
Bracton’s tractate on the assize of darrein presentment124 contains an addicio125—
which shows signs of being the work of more than one author—that references two
cases of Martin of Pattishall:
118. See MARENBON, supra note 89, at 160–61 (observing that what Aberlard did with his Sic et Non
was to work contradictory texts into “debates with discussion,” using this format to build arguments for his
own “preferred” solution).
119. PETER LOMBARD, THE SENTENCES, BOOK 1: THE MYSTERY OF THE HOLY TRINITY 3–5 (Giulio
Silano trans., Pontifical Inst. of Mediaeval Studies 2007) (c. 1158).
120. Id.; SOUTHERN, supra note 88, at 207–08.
121. SOUTHERN, supra note 88, at 204–05.
122. Id.
123. 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 19, 46; SELDEN SOC., supra note 24, at 2.
124. Assizes were procedures of proof in the royal courts made by a group of people—called an assize,
recognition, or, sometimes, a jury—sworn to tell the truth of the matter. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS
IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL 51–53 (1959). Darrein presentment was one of what were
called the petty assizes. Id. at 330. If two people claimed the right to present a priest to the same church, one of
the claimants could acquire a writ of darrein presentment from the royal chancery ordering the royal courts to
look into which of them had made the last presentment to the church. Id. at 330–31. The tractate can be found
at 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 205–44.
125. The addiciones are portions of the text that its editors, Woodbine and Thorne, identified, through
their analysis of the manuscript traditions, as having been added at some point after the exemplar manuscript
from which all of the existing manuscripts descend was put into its final form. Thorne, supra note 24, at xviii.
They were then added into some manuscripts of Bracton, sometimes marked with the word addicio and
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That in the eyre, in all assises . . . an essoin lies, and after the essoin a
resummons, and after the resummons another essoin of absence on the king’s
service, provided the essoined person has his warrant by writ of the lord
king, is proved in the last eyre of Martin of [Pattishall] in the county of
Suffolk, an assise of mortdancestor beginning ‘If Ralph of Wadleysham.’
[But this could well be for this reason, because the tenant was resident
outside the county and in the service of the lord king.] But the contrary may
be found in the county of Kent [in the roll] of the eyre of Martin of
[Pattishall] in the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth years of king
Henry, in Michaelmas term, that no resummons lies in the eyre.126
The addicio starts by telling us how many delaying tactics a litigant being sued by
an assize can use if he is being sued before the king’s justices in eyre.127 The author
tells us that one can use an essoin, a resummons, and then a second essoin, and that we
know this because it “is proved in the last eyre of Martin of [Pattishall] in the county of
Suffolk, an assise of mortdancestor beginning ‘If Ralph of Wadleysham.’”128 By
referencing that case as proof, the author signals to us that we know this is the proper
procedure to follow because it has been handled this way before: the case proves the
rule. But this was not the only way this type of case had been handled before, and it
was not even the only way it had been handled by Martin of Pattishall. As the author of
the addicio tells us, “the contrary may be found in the county of Kent [in the roll] of the
eyre of Martin of [Pattishall] in the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth years of
king Henry, in Michaelmas term, that no resummons lies in the eyre.”129 The author
thus presents us with two contradictory cases. If we are to follow previous practice,
which case should we choose?
One of the authors of the treatise tried to solve this problem. He added a second
addicio between these two cases, which is set in brackets above. Immediately following
the first of these two cases, this author seeks to explain the reasoning behind the first
case, telling us that the reason why there was a resummons in the case “could well be . .

sometimes placed in the margin. Id. It is very difficult to date the addiciones, as some of them contain material
that would have been archaic by the 1230s and others contain materials that could not have been placed in the
treatise before the 1250s. Id. It is possible that some of them are material that was removed from the treatise
during the editing process and then put back into the text at a later date and that still others are accretions to the
text. Id. In this case, we have not only an addicio but an addicio within an addicio, marked off by brackets.
126. Translated from:
Item quod in itinere aliquando iacet essonium et post essonium resummonitio et iterum post
resummonitionem essonium de servitio domini regis, dum tamen essoniatus warantum habeat
per breve domini regis, præter assisam ultimæ præsentationis, quæ excipitur ex certa causa et
necessitate in omnibus assisis, probatur in ultimo itinere Martini de Pateshilla in comitatu
Suffolciæ, assisa mortis antecessoris, si Radulfus de Wadleghesham. Sed hoc bene potuit esse
hoc ratione, quia tenens forte manens fuit extra comitatum et in servitio domini regis.
Contrarium tamen inveniri poterit in comitatu Cantiæ de itinere Martini de Pateshilla anno
regis Henrici undecimo incipiente duodecimo de termino Sancti Michælis quod in itinere nulla
iacet resummonitio.
3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 209 (some alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
127. The eyre was an itinerant royal court that visited the counties periodically, often to the terror of the
residents of the counties. HUDSON, supra note 4, at 123–26.
128. 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 209.
129. Id. (first alteration in original).
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. because the tenant was resident outside the county and in the service of the lord king,”
implying that perhaps the first case cites not a general rule of procedure at the eyre, but
an exception to that rule.130 In other words, the two cases can be reconciled if we
accept that there were some peculiar circumstances in the first case.
This addicio within an addicio was probably written by a different author than the
one who wrote the initial addicio, which seems to be complete on its own. It is
clumsily worked into the text, giving us the solution to the problem before it tells us
what the problem is; it explains how the two cases can be reconciled before we even
know there is a second case that contradicts the first. We are probably, then, dealing
with two cases originally added by an author of the 1230s and an explanation of these
cases added at a later date. This later author seems to have been troubled by the
inconsistency between the cases.
We see this again when an author uses a case about dower to prove a point
slightly different from that in the case. He tells us that, if a woman claiming dower
from a deceased man proves her marriage to that man in an ecclesiastical court, but “an
impediment supervenes, such as war or the like, so that the judgment cannot be put into
effect, and before she comes to the court the tenant dies, in the war perhaps,” she can
recover against the new tenant.131 The author goes to some pain to put this case in very
unspecific terms—the impediment is a war, “or the like,” and the tenant dies in the war
“perhaps”—making it sound like a general rule rather than a case that happened in real
life.132 He gets very specific, though, when he tells us that this was “as [in the roll] of
the eyre of the bishop of Durham and Martin of [Pattishall] in the county of York in the
third year of King Henry, [the case] of Muriel the wife of Hugh de Hammerton,” a case
for which, unfortunately, there is no surviving record to tell us how closely it conforms
to the facts presented in the treatise.133 One might suspect that in a case of this kind,
being heard in the third year of King Henry (1218/1219), a supervening war would
have been less than theoretical, and that the tenant who was keeping Muriel from her
dower had been a victim of the war between King John and the barons following the
issuance of Magna Carta, which had just ended in September of 1217.134 And yet the
author wants the case to sound very general, as if this fact pattern is the basis of a rule
that can apply to many different cases.
The author uses this case to produce an analogy, even if it is not a very profound
one: “[b]y analogy [per simile] it appears that if a woman claims someone as her
husband and the decision is in her favour and not appealed, if the man dies before the
judgment is put into effect she will obtain dower without further proof.”135 The author
130. Id.
131. “[E]t cum mulier in veniendo sit cum inquisitione versus curiam supervenit impedimentum sicut
guerra vel huiusmodi, quod iudicium non poterit executioni demandari, et antequam ad curiam pervenerit
moritur tenens in guerra forte . . . .” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 376.
132. Id.
133. “Ut de itinere episcopi Dunelmensis et Martini de Pateshilla in comitatu Eboraci anno regis
Henrici tertio, de Muriella quæ fuit uxor Hugonis de Havertona.” Id. (first and third alteration in original).
134. W.L. WARREN, KING JOHN 256 (1978).
135. “Per simile videtur quod si mulier petat aliquem in virum, et sententia lata fuerit pro muliere et ab
ea non sit appellatum, si vir moriatur ante executionem iudicii ipsa sine alia probatione dotem obtinebit.” 3
BRACTON, supra note 23, at 376 (footnotes omitted).
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essentially restates the case without the supervening impediment, but it is significant
that the author writes as if he is analogizing from one case to another, per simile, even
if his analogy seems an obvious observation on the case. The case is not merely a
specific set of facts, but a rule that can be applied to other cases.136
We have seen one instance where the authors of the treatise use a case as the
foundation for a new rule and another where they create a rule in the process of
reconciling two contradictory cases. We see them using cases as the foundational
authorities for a system of law. One of the authors shows his concern for the system
very clearly, in a series of case citations where he tries to reconcile several
contradictory opinions. This author tells us that when a tenant loses a case brought by
writ of right by his default he may still correct his default and recover the land “until he
has so put himself on the grand assise that the four knights have been summoned to
choose twelve, according to some, and according to others until the twelve have been
chosen.”137 There is an addicio in the text at this point, the author of which tries,
without success, to resolve the problem. He is troubled by this contradiction among the
ancients: “[b]ecause of the disagreement of the ancients [veteres], nothing certain may
be held as to what ought to be done if the default is made when the four knights have
been summoned to choose [etc.], since some say one thing and some another.”138 The
lack of consensus among the ancients makes it impossible to deduce a single legal rule
from these cases. To try to resolve the problem, the author adduces two cases from the
rolls, one from the sixteenth year of King Henry and one from the fourth and fifth
years, each of which “proves” one side.139 For the latter case, he says that “several
other cases are in accord with this,” perhaps indicating that this case represents the
stronger of the two opinions, although he falls short of telling the reader that this is the
rule to follow.140
This passage shows us that the case’s authority does not come from the date of the
decision. Later cases do not necessarily trump earlier ones. Otherwise the case from
King Henry’s sixteenth year would be the controlling doctrine, and the case from the
fourth and fifth years of Henry, with which many cases were apparently in accord,
would be irrelevant. The author seems to have some sense that more cases are better,
since he tells us that many cases are in accord with this earlier case. The fact that the
case from the fourth and fifth years of Henry represents a trend does not settle the
matter to the justice’s satisfaction, though. He still thinks that “nothing certain may be
held” concerning this point of law.141 The author of this passage thus asserts the
principle that authorities, in this case the royal justices, should be in harmony with each
other even as he is forced to admit that that the harmony breaks down in this instance.
136. See 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 225 (referencing a case for a principle concerning heirs and then
citing an additional case for the principle that “what is said of an heir ought to be applied to a successor”).
137. “[I]ta quod quatuor milites summoniti fuerint ad eligendum duodecim secundum quosdam, et
secundum alios quousque duodecim electi fuerint.” 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 154.
138. “Propter dissensum vero antiquorum non poterit teneri aliquod certum quid fieri debeat si defalta
facta fuerit cum quatuor milites sint summoniti ad eligendum, cum quidam dicant sic quidam contrarium.” Id.
(third alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
139. Id.
140. “Et ad hoc concordant plures alii casus.” Id.
141. Id.
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The Justice’s Authority as an Individual

Bracton, like the texts of the medieval and modern civil law, was a text concerned
with systematizing the law and working out its apparent contradictions. If Bracton’s
version of the dialectic and the modern common law share one thing in common,
however, it is the emphasis on the justice or judge as an individual authority. Where the
modern civil law emphasizes the system over the individual and the modern common
law emphasizes the individual over the system, Bracton’s account of English law kept
the two in balance.
We have seen that the authors introduced cases in ways that show they were
authorities. Words like “prove” show us that the authors thought that the relationship
between text and case references was that of postulate to proof. Additionally, at least
one of the authors used the dialectical method of the schools to show his reader that
cases do not conflict.142 Dialectical reasoning arose out of a very particular idea of
auctoritas that was popular among medieval scholars, a type of auctoritas that was at
once collective and individual. “The fathers” or “the jurists” were, as a bloc, correct,
and their statements formed a system of thought that was self contained and internally
consistent. At the same time, however, each individual father or jurist had his own
authority, which might make sense only with reference to the body as a whole, but
which was nevertheless a type of personal auctoritas. In Bracton we find a tension
between language that emphasizes the justice as an individual and language that
emphasizes his place among a collective body of justices, the same sort of tension we
find in Roman and canon law. The case was, on the one hand, an expression of an
impersonal system of law. But on the other hand it was an expression of the individual
authority and learning of the justice who decided it.
Just as most of the cases are hidden behind the uninformative “ut,” most of our
judges are hidden behind impersonal, passive statements. In most plea roll entries the
justice hides behind the clerk’s “consideratum est” (it is considered), which tells us
only that the case has come to some kind of decision, not who made that decision.143
Less than half of the cases in Bracton—204 out of 527—give the names of the justices
who sat in the case. More often the authors cite only the term and year of King Henry’s
reign: “as [in the roll] of Easter term in the seventh year of king Henry in the county of
Devon.”144 These types of entries were probably useful for readers of the treatise who
also had access to the rolls. Several such entries include the words “in the roll,”
suggesting that this whole case reference may be merely a way of referencing a

142. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text for a discussion of an attempt by the authors of one
of Bracton’s tractates to reconcile two seemingly contradictory cases by framing one case as an exception to
the rule.
143. This passive tradition of case law seems to have been part of the culture of the royal courts in
England and Normandy, since we have collections of cases taken from the rolls of the Norman Exchequer that
generally begin with “judicatum est” (it was judged). Huntington Library MS 1343, for example, includes a
collection of cases from the Norman exchequer and a late thirteenth-century copy of the Norman treatise called
the Summa de Legibus in Curia Laicali, which is also glossed with cases from the exchequer. Most of these
cases begin with the words “judicatum est.”
144. “Ut de termino Paschæ anno regis Henrici septimo comitatu Devoniæ.” 4 BRACTON, supra note 23,
at 225 (alteration in original).
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document, not of ascribing authority.145 Just as 21 U.S. 389 will take you to the 389th
page of the 21st volume of the United States reporter, “of Easter term in the seventh
year of king Henry in the county of Devon,” will take you to the appropriate roll to find
your case.
We might deduce then that authority comes from the case itself, not from the actor
behind it. We might go in another direction entirely and say, along with Cheyette, that
the authors did care about where the authority came from, but that the important part
was that the point in question had been decided in the king’s court. Who made that
decision was much less important than the fact that it had been confirmed in the court
and given the king’s imprimatur. Yet something more active and personal is lurking
behind these phrases. We should not read too much into the passive construction, for
instance, because the passive voice was more highly regarded in medieval Latin than it
is in modern English. We cannot, therefore, assume from the lack of an actor in the
introduction to the case that the authors did not have one in mind.
Although the treatise does give us hints that its authors thought of authority as
being in some way collective, there are also strong indications that they thought of
authority as individual. Conflict between the justices is apparent at several other points
in the treatise. The “some say . . . others say” (quidam dicunt . . . alii dicunt) formula
that appears in so many scholastic texts makes its way into Bracton.146 Sometimes the
authors resolve these disputes, either with their own solutions or that of some judge.147
William of York, whose cases, oddly enough, never appear in the treatise, acts as an
arbiter of law for the author or authors. In one part of the treatise, an author tells us that
“[i]f the eldest [son] dies in the lifetime of the father, some say that no mention need be
made of him as though he had never been in existence,” before an addicio intervenes to
say that this is “according to some, which is not true.”148 A few lines down, another
addicio informs us that there are others, not just the author, who hold the opposite
opinion, as “there are some who say, and it is true, that mention must be made of a son
who has died in the lifetime of his father, the view of William of York.”149 In another
addicio where the author complicates the primary text by admitting that “so [the rule
stated above] seems to some, but to others the contrary seems true,”150 he resolves the
dispute by saying that this new, contrary opinion “was the opinion [ratio] of William of
York, and it is good [bona].”151
William of York is not the only justice whose opinion seems to matter on its own.
Martin of Pattishall—not surprisingly, since his cases are the most frequently

145. 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 52.
146. See id. at 388, 403, 424, 432.
147. Id. at 251 (providing an example of a case where the author resolves competing opinions by arguing
that the latter opinion would create an absurd result).
148. “Si antenatus in vita patris moriatur, dicunt quidam quod nulla de eo fieri debet mentio, ac si
numquam esset in rerum natura secundum quosdam, quod non est verum . . . .” 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at
173 (footnotes omitted).
149. “Sed sunt quidam qui dicunt, et verum est, quod de filio mortuo in vita patris oportet facere
mentionem secundum Willelmum de Eboraco . . . .” Id.
150. “Ut quibusdam videtur, sed aliis videtur contra . . . .” 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 367.
151. “Et hæc fuit ratio W. de Eboraco et bona.” Id. See also 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 66 (providing
an example of a rule that is true “secundum W. de Eboraco”).
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referenced in the treatise—is featured prominently apart from his cases. One author,
probably Pattishall’s clerk, William of Ralegh, tells us what Pattishall was accustomed
to do in certain types of cases. For example, when “boundaries [were] destroyed or
completely altered the lord Martin took an assise as of a free tenement, not as a
trespass. For he used to say that one could not commit a more harmful disseisin than by
destroying boundaries completely, or by moving or removing them.”152 Ralegh uses the
things Martin used to say and do as sources of authority similar to cases in several
places in the treatise.153 In another part of the treatise, we are told what “is better,
according to Martin.”154
In addition to his cases and sayings, other texts of Martin of Pattishall are quoted
and referenced in the treatise, apparently as models for what future justices should do.
His consultations to the ecclesiastical courts on issues of jurisdiction are preserved in
two places. On one occasion an author signals that Pattishall’s words are authoritative
and definitive by using the “ought” language often used to introduce cases: “When the
ordinary has received the letters of the lord king, he ought to proceed to hold the
inquest in this way, according to the consultation of Martin.”155
Royal writs occasionally appear in the treatise as the words of royal justices.
When we do, very occasionally, see writs introduced with authority words of the type
that the authors use for cases, an individual justice is the driving force behind that
authority. For instance, when a widower without children is unlawfully holding his
dead wife’s land against the interests of his wife’s heir—when, in other words, he is
trying to claim curtsey when no curtsey is due to him—“the heir is aided by the writ
drawn by William of Ralegh for Ralph of Dodescumbe.”156 A heading introducing a
writ at another point in the treatise reads, “Writ on the constitution of Merton, which
was then provided by William Ralegh, then justiciar.”157 Statutes appear only
occasionally in the treatise. Although statutes in the thirteenth century were written in
the voice of the king, in the treatise they are often ascribed to judges as well, and can
even appear in the same format as cases. One heading, very similar to the one
introducing William of Ralegh’s writ above, reads, “Of the constitution of Merton by
William of Ralegh, then justiciar.”158 It seems that statutes, like writs and cases, were

152. “Dominus tamen Martinus assisam cepit de divisis corruptis vel mutatis omnino sicut de libero et
non sicut de transgressione. Dicebat enim quod non potuit quis magis iniuriosam facere disseisinam quam de
terminis demoliendis omnino vel corrumpendis in parte vel amovendis . . . .” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at
128 (footnotes omitted).
153. Martin of Pattishall is not the only justice whose “sayings” are recorded. At one point the author of
an addicio says that a particular doctrine having to do with curtsey “was wrongful according to Stephen of
Segrave,” and that “[h]e used to say that this law was misunderstood and misapplied.” 4 BRACTON, supra note
23, at 360 (footnote omitted).
154. 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 122.
155. “Ordinarius cum litteras domini regis acceperit secundum consultationem Martini procedere debet
ad inquisitione faciendam, hoc modo.” Id. at 373 (footnotes omitted).
156. “[C]onsulitur heredi per tale breve per Willelmum de Ralegha formatum pro Radulfo de
Dodescumbe . . . .” 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 362 (footnotes omitted).
157. “Breve de constitutione de Mertona secundum quod tunc provisum fuit per Willelmum de Ralegha
tunc iustitiarium.” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 180.
158. “De constitutione de Mertona per Willelmum de Ralegha tunc iustitiarium.” Id. at 179.
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important to the authors of the treatise because they are places where one can find the
justice’s words.
The examples above are not cases, but they do show us that the authors of the
treatise thought that some justices were important as individual authorities, not simply
as cogs in a legal machine. The authors legitimize the good opinions of the text by
noting they come from specific justices like William of York and William of Ralegh.
Martin of Pattishall’s consultations, speeches, acts, and advice served as models for
future judicial action. Judicial writing, in all its forms, is important to these authors as a
source of authority.
If justices can speak as individuals, they can also disagree with each other, and the
authors of the treatise at times have to rely on the greater individual authority of one
justice over that of another, as in the case of serjeanties: the treatise authors tells us
that, since they are not military fees in the same sense as a fee held by knight-service,
the chief lord has no right to the marriage or wardship of the heir to a serjeanty;
[b]ut the contrary may be seen [in the case] of an abbess of Barking, among
the pleas which follow the king in the [seventeenth] year of King Henry
before William of Ralegh, who recovered the wardship and marriage of the
heir of one of her tenants who held his tenement [in serjeanty] in the manor
of Barking by the service of riding with her from manor to manor; [a result]
Stephen of Segrave did not approve.159
Here, William of Ralegh, who was most probably deeply involved with one stage of
the writing of the treatise, is put in opposition to both the author of this passage and to
Stephen of Segrave, whose opinion lines up with the author’s own.
Robert of Lexington rarely fares well when he appears in the treatise. At least one
of the authors must have seen him as something of a dunce among the English
judiciary, since he is “corrected” twice: Once, when he held that an assize utrum could
lie in a case involving a cathedral or convent, he was corrected “of Easter term in the
fifteenth year of the reign of king Henry,” which, although the author does not tell us
this, was a certification to the bench at Westminster, meaning that he was essentially
overturned.160 The second time, the hapless Robert ruled that a question of bastardy
should be sent to the bishop’s court, even though the alleged bastard’s father had
recognized him as legitimate, “a ruling which was revoked and corrected by [per]
Martin of Pattishall.”161 Cases like the ones where Ralegh and Pattishall correct
Lexington give us tantalizing glimpses at what might be hiding behind the impersonal
ut of all those other cases cited in the treatise. We see, just occasionally, a human being
proving, correcting, revoking, or denying a principle of law.
The authors of Bracton thought the cases contained in the plea rolls were
authorities in the same way medieval scholars understood the words of the jurists in the
159. “Contrarium tamen habetur de quadam abbatissa de Berkinge inter placita quæ sequuntur regem
anno regis Henrici—coram Willelmo de Ralegha, et quæ recuperavit custodiam et maritagium de herede
cuiusdam tenentis sui, qui tenebat tenementum suum in manerio de Berkinge per servitium equitandi cum ea
de manerio in manerium, quod quidem S. de Segrave non approbavit.” 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 113
(emphasis added) (some alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
160. 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 331.
161. “[Q]uod quidem revocatum fuit et correctum per Martinum de Pateshilla.” 4 BRACTON, supra note
23, at 300.
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Digest to be authorities. Justices were treated as individuals with authority, just as they
are in modern common law. But their individual authority was counterbalanced by an
emphasis on the individual as part of a system, an emphasis they acquired from civil
law. The justices’ writings could be used as the basis for new knowledge, created
through dialectical reasoning. The authors of Bracton were the dwarfs standing on the
shoulders of the giants who had written these cases earlier in the century.
IV. CASE LAW, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN
Even if there is something of a debate in the United States right now about
whether case law is actually very important in modern law, about whether statutes and
administrative regulations have superseded cases as the place where most legal change
happens, and whether the case is adapting to look more like the statute and the
regulation, case law is still undoubtedly the basis of common law culture.162 To the
American lawyer, common law is a law that grows organically, induced from real-life
cases, not a law deduced from general principles. This kind of thinking pervades the
system. It provides common lawyers with one of their primary arguments for the
superiority of common law over civil law, its main competitor in the world today. Civil
law, which sees itself as the direct heir to Roman law, places the code, not the case, at
the center, and makes the judge the servant of the legislator’s will.163 The common
lawyer usually presents the civil law as too rigid, too bound to the words of a code that,
despite its claims to be all-encompassing, could not possibly contain a solution for
every legal issue that could arise.164 The common law, on the other hand, is a flexible
system that refines itself over time.165
For example, in Comparative Legal Traditions: Texts, Materials, and Cases, a
casebook for use in American law classes, there is a definitive split in the way the two
legal systems are described.166 According to the authors, the defining features of the
civil law are “a particular interaction in its early formative period among Roman law,
Germanic and local customs, canon law, the international law merchant, and . . . a
distinctive response to the break with feudalism and the rise of nation states, as well as
by the peculiar role it has accorded to legal science.”167 The tone is neither laudatory
nor condemnatory, although the role the civil law accords to legal science is described
as “peculiar.”168 But, for the most part, this definition merely describes the common
features of civil law systems as the authors see them.

162. Justice Scalia, in particular, has argued that case law is now subordinate to statute law and that, as a
result, the case method should largely be abandoned in favor of teaching methods that focus on statutes.
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 4–10 (1997); Frederick
Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1455–56 (1995).
163. LASSER, supra note 1, at 168–74.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 28.
166. MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS, AND CASES
ON THE CIVIL AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRENCH, GERMAN, ENGLISH AND
EUROPEAN LAW (2d ed. 1994).
167. Id. at 44.
168. Id.
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The authors’ description of the common law, however, strikes an entirely different
tone:
English common law evolved from necessity; the law was rooted in
centralized administration of William, conqueror at Hastings. A single event,
the 1066 Norman Conquest, was the progenitor of this tradition, its
foundation a unique, “unwritten” constitution and the recorded, but orally
rendered decisions of an extraordinarily gifted and respected judiciary. The
harmony of a homogeneous society, tested by internal stresses but free of
foreign invasion for nearly a millennium, aided an orderly development of
legal institutions. Focusing on the resolution of specific, current issues,
English law developed insulated from the continental reception of Roman
law, and the later emphasis on codification. As Pollock has said, English
laws “grew in rugged exclusiveness, disdaining fellowship with the more
polished learning of the civilians.”169
The common law is the “unique” product of “the harmony of a homogeneous society”
that was “free of foreign invasion,” which allowed it to develop “insulated” (in the
literal sense) from civil law influence.170 The language here does not merely describe
an insular, English development, it celebrates it, so that when Pollock’s quote comes in
at the end to suggest that the civil law was “more polished” than the common law, it
sounds more like a point of national pride than a real concession to the civil law.
Common law is a triumphal law, the product of a “conqueror.”171 It is also a flexible,
pragmatic system developed by “an extraordinarily gifted and respected judiciary,”
which was concerned with the “resolution of specific, current issues.”172 This
description highlights the fact that it is judges who move the law forward with special
attention to the needs of the time. Enter case law.
So much of the American lawyer’s identity is bound up in the idea that American
law is based on cases partly because law schools still teach using the case method
instituted by Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard in the late nineteenth century,
a method that has made its way into popular culture through John Jay Osborn’s novel
The Paper Chase and the film and television series based on it.173 Even the most
statute- and regulation-based areas of law, such as administrative law and tax law, are
generally taught through cases that explain those statutes and regulations.174 The judges
who write the cases know that they are writing for a larger audience than the parties
before them. They are writing for their peers on the bench, in the legal profession, and,
potentially, if they explain a point of law particularly cogently, for first-year law

169. Id. at 438. The two descriptions may very well have been written by different authors and this may
partially account for the difference in tone. I do not mean to disparage an excellent casebook, only to point out
the very different ways we, as common lawyers, perceive the common law and the civil law.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 691 (1995); JOHN JAY
OSBORN, THE PAPER CHASE (1970); THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973); The Paper Chase
(CBS television broadcast, 1978–79, Showtime television broadcast 1983–86).
174. See, e.g., SANFORD M. GUERIN ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
(7th ed. 2008).
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students.175 Even if we were to posit that cases are not the major source of law for the
American common law system, they would still be an important part of the common
law’s culture. And even if lawyers do not use cases all that much, they think that they
do, and they think that knowledge of cases is what defines their profession.
Because of this emphasis on the case as part of common law culture, there has
been much written about case law and how it operates.176 Many of the models used to
describe common law reasoning focus on the writing judges do in published opinions.
Ronald Dworkin, for instance, has likened common law reasoning to a chain novel, in
which several authors are asked to each write one chapter of a book in succession, so
that the first author writes the first chapter and then hands it off to the second, who
must write the second chapter using the first as the basis for his story.177 The second
author thus has room for creativity, but he is also constrained by what the first author
has written.178 In Dworkin’s estimation, the second author’s duty is to make the novel
the best novel it can be given what the first author wrote, not to cast aside what the first
author wrote and write a better novel. He does this according to the “aesthetic
hypothesis”: the author writes the new chapter or opinion based on what will make the
best novel or the best system of law, according to the author’s own view of what is
best.179 Dworkin’s image does a good job of describing how the relationship between
change and fidelity to authority can be dynamic in a legal system. His chain novelist is
an author whose creativity comes into the work in several ways. He must build upon
what has been written by his forebears and must use his own idea of what makes the
best system when he does so. But the final product does not come entirely from his
individual genius; it is the product of a tradition.
Dworkin’s model presents the common law as an unfolding story told by the
judge. One might ask, however, if judicial writing is actually the most relevant site
where legal knowledge is created in the common law. I would suggest that the power of
Dworkin’s model to explain the way the common law system works is limited by the
fact that it treats only half of the work we expect cases to do in the American common
law.
The case plays two important roles in the Anglo-American common law, and
those roles, although not completely distinct, are different in some ways. First, as
Dworkin rightly points out, the case is a vibrant method to effectuate legal change. But
when we look at this other major site where cases are important to the common law, the
classroom, we see a different type of dynamic. The didactic and epistemological
strategies that take place in the law school classroom are just as important to the

175. See Schauer, supra note 162, at 1472.
176. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2010);
Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal Court Uses of Supreme
Court Decision, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 325 (1987); Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses
of the Concurrence by the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 777 (1990); Ryan M. Moore, Comment, I
Concur! Do I Matter?: Developing a Framework for the Influence of Concurring Opinions, 84 TEMP. L. REV.
743 (2012).
177. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 158–62 (1985) [hereinafter MATTER OF PRINCIPLE];
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228–38 (1986) [hereinafter LAW’S EMPIRE].
178. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 177, at 234.
179. MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 177, at 149.
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creation of common law culture as the case law created in the courtroom: judges are,
after all, formed in this environment. It is also a more democratic space than the
judicial opinion. Whereas the judicial opinion privileges one particular actor—the
judge—the law school classroom is a space where professors, future lawyers, and
future judges use cases to learn the law and, more importantly, to create legal
knowledge. I would suggest that the types of reasoning that go on in the law school
classroom can be more usefully modeled by the medieval dialectic than by the chain
novel.
The classroom is a space where the opinions produced by judges are refined from
long documents into short, abstract rules. The process actually begins before the
student is ever assigned a case to read. As Frederick Schauer has pointed out,
“appellate opinions are not the primary teaching vehicles in American law schools—
that role is served by severely edited appellate opinions as they appear in
casebooks.”180 When the student reads the case, she further refines it by abstracting a
holding, a legal rule, out of it. The case, which may be very long even in its edited
form, is transformed into a single sentence. The professor then challenges the student
with hypothetical cases that usually alter the facts of the initial case progressively, by
small degrees, until it becomes more difficult to justify the application of the holding
from the present case to the new set of facts. The hypothetical presses beyond the
bounds of the opinion, to places where the rule that the student and the professor have
refined from the opinion pushes up against other rules in other cases. It encourages the
student to try to reconcile competing rules, to distinguish them from each other in
principled ways, and to decide whether the rule in this case should be applied in a more
marginal set of facts or whether a competing norm should take over.
Midway through the semester, the emphasis shifts from refining rules out of cases
to organizing those rules into a system of knowledge. Around their fall break, law
students usually begin to work on a different type of legal-literary project: the
outline.181 This document forces the student to take the rules she has abstracted from
cases and to organize them into a rational system marked off by sections and
subsections. In the process, the student makes something that looks more like a civil
law code, or possibly a medieval summa, than a judicial opinion. Medieval summae
often came out of the teaching process. Students and teachers at times compiled their
disputation notes into texts that were meant to circulate as independent texts; Thomas
Aquinas’s theological text De veritate was simply a classroom disputation that he
wrote in book form and his Summa Theologiae is a long series of quaestiones.182 In the
modern American law school, outlines have similarly come to stand on their own as
literature, but they occupy a very different space than the systematic works of medieval
law. Lawyers and professors write outlines for commercial consumption, but they are
not considered high scholarship like their medieval counterparts. Law professors, with
a few exceptions, tend to regard them as the law school equivalents to CliffsNotes, a

180. Schauer, supra note 162, at 1472.
181. See John Henry Schlegel, Damn! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 765, 767 (1995) (describing
how students instinctively turn to outlining to organize the material they learn). Of course, the student might
also buy a ready-made outline.
182. MARENBON, supra note 89, at 216–17.
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shortcut to learning that is no replacement for the hard work of making an outline on
your own.183 Nevertheless, some future historian of legal education in the early twentyfirst century might argue that their importance is out of proportion to the regard the
legal academy pays them. As of 1994, Emanuel’s was selling 150,000 study aids per
year.184
The American Law Institute has turned the legal outline into a type of text that the
academy does hold in high regard. The ALI’s restatements of the law were originally
intended “to present an orderly statement of the general common law of the United
States.”185 The reporter for the original Restatement of Property, William Draper
Lewis, expressed his concern that “the ever increasing volume of the decisions of the
courts, establishing new rules or precedents, and the numerous instances in which the
decisions are irreconcilable, taken in connection with the growing complication of
economic and other conditions of modern life, [were] increasing the law’s uncertainty
and lack of clarity,” a statement worthy of Justinian himself.186 Lewis feared that this
lack of clarity would “force the abandonment of our common-law system of expressing
and developing law through judicial application of existing rules to new fact
combinations and the adoption in its place of rigid legislative codes, unless a new
factor promoting certainty and clarity can be found.”187 According to Lewis, the very
thing that makes the common law flexible, its nature as a law that grows organically
out of the decisions of judges, like Dworkin’s chain novel, also makes it disorganized
and unmanageable. It was out of fear that the common law was becoming an
unworkable system and that something needed to be done to harmonize the cacophony
of competing opinions that the ALI began the process of restating the common law.
The process was one of harmonization, much like the process we have seen in
texts like Bracton and Gratian’s Decretum. The resulting restatements look much like
civil law codes. Indeed, Benjamin Cardozo recognized the similarity between the new
restatements and the texts of the civil law when he described the new restatements as
“something less than a code and something more than a treatise.”188 Ironically, in their
drive to preserve the flexibility of the common law and to prevent the advent of “rigid
legislative codes,” the ALI created something that looks distinctly code-like.189 Both
Lewis and Cardozo show their ambivalence to the judge-made and judge-centered rules
of the common law: the Hurculean judges of Dworkin’s chain novel are absent from
the restatement, which speaks in a unified voice. Saving the common law, to the ALI,
meant systematizing and depersonalizing the common law. It bears another

183. See Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of
Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547, 642 (1997) (explaining that law professors discourage use of
purchased outlines). But see Eric E. Johnson, A Populist Manifesto for Learning the Law, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC.
41, 45 (2010) (asserting that study aids are akin to treatises and wondering why professors discourage them).
184. Sheppard, supra note 183, at 641.
185. William Draper Lewis, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, at viii–ix (1936).
186. Id. at ix; see DIG. (Justinian, Constitutio Deo Auctore, proem.) (“We have found, however, the
whole course of the law, which has descended from the founding of the city and the Romulean times, thus to
be confused, so that it is stretched out to infinity and is not confined within the capacity of human nature.”).
187. Lewis, supra note 185, at ix.
188. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 9 (1924).
189. Lewis, supra note 185, at ix.
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resemblance to both the case and to the scholastic disputation: the restatement moves
law forward. In fact, the reporters often consciously adopt rules that are not currently in
the majority, but which instead reflect a trend in the jurisprudence that the reporters
favor.190
Both the outline and the restatement organize the law; and the restatement, at
least, pushes the bounds of legal knowledge. The major difference between Dworkin’s
judge deciding a case and the legal scholar or law student producing a restatement or
outline is that while Dworkin’s Hurculean judge191 is creating a document that presents
itself as dynamic and moving law forward, the authors of the latter two documents
present the law as static. They give us a snapshot of the law at a particular time,
transformed from real-life cases into abstract rules, which are neatly organized into
conceptual categories. They support their static structure with references to cases.
Students include references to cases in their outlines; reporters include discussion of the
relevant case law along with the abstract rules they have drawn out of that case law.
The restatement and the student outline are surely designed to fit to some kind of
aesthetic principle, but the principle operates in a different way than it does in the chain
of cases, where the judge is tasked to fit his analysis into a line of authority. The
student outline and the restatement are thus documents that play the kinds of roles the
scholastic quaestio and summa played in the Middle Ages. They create harmony out of
authority and, in the process, present us with a different type of dynamic between
continuity and change in the common law than we would perceive if we focused only
on the work done by the judge in writing the opinion.192
Comparing and contrasting the cases in Bracton with these models allows us to
better understand how the outline, the restatement, and Bracton all work as texts.
Bracton highlights the individual authority of the justice that would, many centuries
later, become a hallmark of the common law. It also highlights the systematic nature of
the law that is still a hallmark of the civil law. Both tendencies are on the surface in the
text. In the modern American common law, both tendencies exist, but the tendency
towards systematization is largely buried beneath the image of law as an unfolding
story told by judges. If we turn away from the positivist discourse about the common
law that focuses on the authoritative statements of law found in judicial opinions and
towards the documents created by law students and professors, then the modern
common law’s modes of knowledge-production-through-writing look a lot more like
the medieval dialectic than they do like Dworkin’s chain novelist. Scholars in the
medieval universities put their authorities in opposition to each other in order to push
the boundaries of authority and create new rules out of old ones. They asked questions
and, in the process of answering them, organized legal knowledge into a coherent,

190. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, at vii
(1969) (explaining the Restatement’s sensitivity to standards rather than “dogma”).
191. As a thought experiment, Dworkin creates an “imaginary judge of superhuman intellectual power
and patience” named Hercules. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 177, at 239.
192. Mitchel Lasser has shown how the analysis of a legal system can be enriched by looking to the
types of literature a legal system produces beyond those that carry the force of law. For instance, Lasser
discovered a “hidden discourse” in the preliminary texts that the French Cour de Cassation uses to create
judicial decisions. LASSER, supra note 1, at 47.
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internally consistent system.193 The student outline and the restatement of law similarly
use the debates that the case book raises to organize the field into a coherent system.
The medieval civilian emphasis on the harmony of the system, which was new to
English law in the thirteenth century, seems to be with us today as well. When we look
at documents other than cases, Anglo-American common law looks much less insular
than it does when we focus on the defining feature of common law culture. Common
law then becomes part of a common, Roman-inspired, Western legal culture.
V.

CONCLUSION

Case law is culturally important to the common law today. But does it separate the
common law from the civil law? England’s first case law was inspired by civilian
thought, and even today the types of epistemological work that are done in common
law and in civil law are essentially the same. They share a common ancestry in
medieval scholastic law, which bequeathed to both legal families an emphasis on law
as a harmonious system of rules and concepts. Medieval scholars talked of their work
in terms of bringing harmony to the system they had received from antiquity. When
they reconciled texts, the assumption was that the truths they were drawing forth were
already latent in the ancient texts, which must form a coherent and harmonious
system.194 Of course, they created new thought by reconciling certain texts with other
texts, but the idiom of progress was one of refinement, not of originality. As one might
expect with a dwarf standing on a giant’s shoulder, the lion’s share of the focus was on
the giant, not on the dwarf.
Of course, to say that the differences between common law and civil law
(medieval and modern) are more in the perception than in the practice does not make
those differences any less real. The metaphors we use to talk about what we do are
important. The harmonization that was at the center of medieval scholastic legal texts is
alive and well, but it is more central to the civil law than it is to the common law
because of the different emphases present in the two systems. In the modern civil law,
which adopted the medieval emphasis on harmony and system as its primary textual
aesthetic, this work takes place in the code—a very privileged space. The
harmonization, synthesis, and systematization that were the hallmarks of medieval
scholastic legal texts like Bracton take place in the modern common law, only less
overtly in the privileged space of the judicial opinion and more so in the largely
ignored space of the student outline and the more honored, but still peripheral, space of
the restatement. The fact that common law and civil law do the same type of work in
different spaces, both physical and literary, is important to the way they develop.
Mitchel Lasser has shown, for instance, that although the French Cour de Cassation
and the United States Supreme Court both make formalist and policy-based arguments
in formulating new legal rules, they do so in very different spaces, and that difference
affects the arguments themselves.195
193. See SOUTHERN, supra note 88, at 204–05 (describing how written summaries of knowledge are
used to fuel new explorations).
194. See MINNIS, supra note 92, at 14 (noting that scholars did not compete with authoritative texts but
rather studied, assimilated, and imitated them).
195. LASSER, supra note 1, at 15.
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What looking beyond the cases to the types of texts that common lawyers write
around cases does show us, though, is that there is a common core to Western legal
discourse, whether it is in common law or civil law. This discourse assumes that law is
a system, not merely a collection of rules and commands, and that that system should
strive towards harmony. In this sense, the medieval dialectic has left its mark on all of
Western legal thought, and the common law and the civil law are both heirs to the
medieval Romanist and canonist tradition.

